80 ideas
| 18495 | The best philosophers I know are the best people I know [Heil] |
| 18494 | Using a technical vocabulary actually prevents discussion of the presuppositions [Heil] |
| 18506 | Questions of explanation should not be confused with metaphyics [Heil] |
| 18535 | Without abstraction we couldn't think systematically [Heil] |
| 224 | When questions are doubtful we should concentrate not on objects but on ideas of the intellect [Plato] |
| 232 | Opposites are as unlike as possible [Plato] |
| 8937 | Plato's 'Parmenides' is the greatest artistic achievement of the ancient dialectic [Hegel on Plato] |
| 18534 | Truth relates truthbearers to truthmakers [Heil] |
| 18531 | Philosophers of the past took the truthmaking idea for granted [Heil] |
| 18509 | Not all truths need truthmakers - mathematics and logic seem to be just true [Heil] |
| 13986 | Plato found antinomies in ideas, Kant in space and time, and Bradley in relations [Plato, by Ryle] |
| 14150 | Plato's 'Parmenides' is perhaps the best collection of antinomies ever made [Russell on Plato] |
| 18518 | Infinite numbers are qualitatively different - they are not just very large numbers [Heil] |
| 18500 | How could structures be mathematical truthmakers? Maths is just true, without truthmakers [Heil] |
| 16150 | One is, so numbers exist, so endless numbers exist, and each one must partake of being [Plato] |
| 229 | The one was and is and will be and was becoming and is becoming and will become [Plato] |
| 21821 | Plato's Parmenides has a three-part theory, of Primal One, a One-Many, and a One-and-Many [Plato, by Plotinus] |
| 18539 | Our categories lack the neat arrangement needed for reduction [Heil] |
| 221 | Absolute ideas, such as the Good and the Beautiful, cannot be known by us [Plato] |
| 18505 | Fundamental ontology aims at the preconditions for any true theory [Heil] |
| 18499 | Our quantifications only reveal the truths we accept; the ontology and truthmakers are another matter [Heil] |
| 18512 | Ontology aims to give the fundamental categories of being [Heil] |
| 18508 | Most philosophers now (absurdly) believe that relations fully exist [Heil] |
| 18532 | If causal relations are power manifestations, that makes them internal relations [Heil] |
| 18510 | We need properties to explain how the world works [Heil] |
| 18522 | Categorical properties were introduced by philosophers as actual properties, not if-then properties [Heil] |
| 18513 | Emergent properties will need emergent substances to bear them [Heil] |
| 18540 | Predicates only match properties at the level of fundamentals [Heil] |
| 18533 | In Fa, F may not be a property of a, but a determinable, satisfied by some determinate [Heil] |
| 18511 | Properties have causal roles which sets can't possibly have [Heil] |
| 18523 | Are all properties powers, or are there also qualities, or do qualities have the powers? [Heil] |
| 18524 | Properties are both qualitative and dispositional - they are powerful qualities [Heil] |
| 223 | If you deny that each thing always stays the same, you destroy the possibility of discussion [Plato] |
| 227 | You must always mean the same thing when you utter the same name [Plato] |
| 228 | Greatness and smallness must exist, to be opposed to one another, and come into being in things [Plato] |
| 211 | If admirable things have Forms, maybe everything else does as well [Plato] |
| 219 | If absolute ideas existed in us, they would cease to be absolute [Plato] |
| 16151 | Plato moves from Forms to a theory of genera and principles in his later work [Plato, by Frede,M] |
| 210 | It would be absurd to think there were abstract Forms for vile things like hair, mud and dirt [Plato] |
| 220 | The concept of a master includes the concept of a slave [Plato] |
| 212 | The whole idea of each Form must be found in each thing which participates in it [Plato] |
| 216 | If things are made alike by participating in something, that thing will be the absolute idea [Plato] |
| 215 | If things partake of ideas, this implies either that everything thinks, or that everything actually is thought [Plato] |
| 218 | Participation is not by means of similarity, so we are looking for some other method of participation [Plato] |
| 213 | Each idea is in all its participants at once, just as daytime is a unity but in many separate places at once [Plato] |
| 214 | If absolute greatness and great things are seen as the same, another thing appears which makes them seem great [Plato] |
| 217 | Nothing can be like an absolute idea, because a third idea intervenes to make them alike (leading to a regress) [Plato] |
| 18498 | Abstract objects wouldn't be very popular without the implicit idea of truthmakers [Heil] |
| 15851 | Parts must belong to a created thing with a distinct form [Plato] |
| 18507 | Substances bear properties, so must be simple, and not consist of further substances [Heil] |
| 15846 | In Parmenides, if composition is identity, a whole is nothing more than its parts [Plato, by Harte,V] |
| 15849 | Plato says only a one has parts, and a many does not [Plato, by Harte,V] |
| 15850 | Anything which has parts must be one thing, and parts are of a one, not of a many [Plato] |
| 18515 | Spatial parts are just regions, but objects depend on and are made up of substantial parts [Heil] |
| 18516 | A 'gunky' universe would literally have no parts at all [Heil] |
| 13259 | It seems that the One must be composed of parts, which contradicts its being one [Plato] |
| 18514 | Many wholes can survive replacement of their parts [Heil] |
| 18517 | Dunes depend on sand grains, but line segments depend on the whole line [Heil] |
| 15847 | Two things relate either as same or different, or part of a whole, or the whole of the part [Plato] |
| 18502 | If basic physics has natures, then why not reality itself? That would then found the deepest necessities [Heil] |
| 18496 | If possible worlds are just fictions, they can't be truthmakers for modal judgements [Heil] |
| 18525 | Mental abstraction does not make what is abstracted mind-dependent [Heil] |
| 18504 | Only particulars exist, and generality is our mode of presentation [Heil] |
| 18503 | You can think of tomatoes without grasping what they are [Heil] |
| 18538 | Non-conscious thought may be unlike conscious thought [Heil] |
| 18537 | Linguistic thought is just as imagistic as non-linguistic thought [Heil] |
| 18536 | The subject-predicate form reflects reality [Heil] |
| 18497 | Many reject 'moral realism' because they can't see any truthmakers for normative judgements [Heil] |
| 222 | Only a great person can understand the essence of things, and an even greater person can teach it [Plato] |
| 18519 | If there were infinite electrons, they could vanish without affecting total mass-energy [Heil] |
| 225 | The unlimited has no shape and is endless [Plato] |
| 231 | Everything partakes of the One in some way [Plato] |
| 2062 | The only movement possible for the One is in space or in alteration [Plato] |
| 233 | Some things do not partake of the One [Plato] |
| 18526 | We should focus on actual causings, rather than on laws and causal sequences [Heil] |
| 18527 | Probabilistic causation is not a weak type of cause; it is just a probability of there being a cause [Heil] |
| 18520 | Electrons are treated as particles, but they lose their individuality in relations [Heil] |
| 13440 | Causation is the power of one property to produce another, and this gives time its direction [Esfeld] |
| 18501 | Maybe the universe is fine-tuned because it had to be, despite plans by God or Nature? [Heil] |
| 234 | We couldn't discuss the non-existence of the One without knowledge of it [Plato] |